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I.

INTRODUCTION

National security disputes between the U.S. and the People's Republic
of China ("PRC") routinely involve cutting-edge technology.' These disputes
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Charles Duan, OfMonopolies and Monocultures: The Intersection ofPatents and National
Security, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 370 (2020).
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include the infrastructure race to fifth-generation ("5G") wireless mobile
technology, cybersecurity, and trade secrets theft but have not generally extended
to fights over patent policy.2 That has begun to change very purposefully at the
behest of PRC policymakers. 3 The Communist Party has moved to use domestic
and international tribunals to push, for example, royalties associated with 5G
technologies on favorable terms for PRC companies, based in large part on those
companies' U.S. patent holdings. 4 U.S. officials and policymakers raised alarms
at the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") in 2018 when it
became clear that national PRC policies had resulted in a flood of "bad-faith
trademark applications" stressing the system, resulting in rulemaking addressing
the problem and officials raising national security concerns. 5 This suggests that
a closer look at how the Communist Party and PRC corporations wield the far
more economically significant U.S. patent system is warranted. As of yet,
however, the USPTO and U.S. policymakers have resisted anything other than
the most superficial analyses of patent filings submitted by foreign state actors.
As national security depends largely on innovative technologies, and patent
policy has the potential to vastly foster or hinder such innovation,6 which directly
and indirectly impacts business and industry profitability in the aggregate, the
U.S. should modify its patent policies to recognize that state-sponsored entities
can and do use U.S. patents to drain resources from domestic investment into
new technologies and may do so at the behest of (or at least in line with) foreign
national policies, to the disadvantage of U.S. domestic security and business
concerns.7

2

Id. at 374-77, 394-95.

3
See, e.g., China Is Becoming More Assertive in International Legal Disputes, THE
ECONOMIST (Sept. 18, 2021), https://www.economist.com/china/china-is-becoming-moreassertive-in-international-legal-disputes/21804496.
4
Id. ("In the past year Chinese courts have issued sweeping orders on behalf of Chinese
smartphone-makers that seek to prevent lawsuits against them in other countries over the use of
foreign companies' intellectual property. The Chinese courts have ordered these "'anti-suit
injunctions"' so that they (rather than foreign courts) can decide how much the Chinese firmsHuawei, Oppo and Xiaomi-should pay in royalties to the holders of patents that their products
use.").

5
See Jacob Gershman, Floodof TrademarkApplications from China Alarms U.S. Officials,
WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/flood-of-trademark-applicationsfromchinaalarms-u-s-officials-1525521600; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARKS AND
PATENTS IN CHINA: THE IMPACT OF NON-MARKET FACTORS ON FILING TRENDS AND IP SYSTEMS 1
(Jan.
2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOTrademarkPatentsInChina.pdf(finding that "[a] growing number of suspect trademarkapplications
filed in the United States from China prompted the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to
study the reasons for this development," and concluding that "China's filings are influenced by
non-market factors such as subsidies, government mandates, bad-faith trademark applications, and
defensive countermeasures").
6
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. PoL'Y 273, 275 (1998).
7

See infra Part IV (outlining recommendations to require ownership disclosures).
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But, today, it is impossible for the U.S. government to comprehensively
know to whom it is granting patents. Currently, the USPTO has no mandatory
recordation requirements to identify the attributable owners of patent
applications. 8 The USPTO receives and publishes only patent ownership
9
information that the applicant or patent owner voluntarily submits. Under
current procedure, the front page of a granted U.S. patent lists the name of the
initially proclaimed inventor or owner of the patent (i.e., the assignee), as
10
reported on the application at the time of initial filing. Moreover, after the initial
filing, there is no requirement that patent owners update the assignee information
during subsequent changes in ownership, meaning that, in the event that a new
owner purchases the patent, only the old assignee may be listed on the patent
document." As there is no standardized method for designating patent
ownership, the listed owner on a patent may not match the actual owner-for
example, one who has acquired the patent after it was issued. Consequently, the
information the USPTO has on file is often outdated and can be misleading to
the public.12 Given that neither the Patent Act nor USPTO regulations require
any recordation of assignee information, USPTO records provide poor notice
13
regarding current ownership of patents. Thus, the U.S. government itself does
not know how many U.S. patents international companies own, license, control,
or could assert in U.S. federal court.
A free-market proponent might encourage private parties to contract
around government record-keeping efforts or suggest government recordation
might hinder the liquidity of the patent marketplace. But this would ignore the
global reality of U.S. patent grants-given more than half of U.S. patent
applicants listed on applications are foreign-born-and the dramatic national
policy implications that come with that knowledge." Although global patent

See Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105, 4108
8
(proposed Jan. 24, 2014) (considered for codification at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1; currently abandoned)
(aiming "to provide greater transparency concerning the ownership of patent applications and
patents").

9

Id. at 4108.

to

Id.

"

Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Heidi Williams, Reforming the Patent System, THE HAMILTON

PROJECT

1,

(June

5

17,

2020),

https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Ouellette_Williams LO_6.16_FINAL.pdf-.
12
Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4108.
13

See FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING

REMEDIES

WITH

IP

COMPETITION

MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND

129-31

(Mar.

2011),

https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligningpatent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafter
FTC REPORT] (providing that this failure makes it extremely difficult to trace back to the true
assignee of a patent as the information is "'buried somewhere on the website' rather than included
[in] the patent record").
14

See StatisticsSummary Table, CalendarYears 1963 to 2020, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK

OFF.,

https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_Stat.htm (May, 2021) [hereinafter Statistics
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policy aims on many levels "to eliminate . . . duplication of work, to enhance
patent examination efficiency and quality, and to guarantee the stability of
[universal] patent rights" regardless of who the owner is, these goals require
global cooperation and transparency, which are undermined at times by
questionable state-sponsored actors manipulating applicant-blind systems.' 5
Ignoring the very real possibility of, for example, state-sponsored efforts to use
U.S. patents to exert financial pressure on worldwide marketplaces risks granting
a huge strategic advantage to state actors who have no qualms about using
international patent systems for their own national gain.
Indeed, Huawei, a Chinese telecommunication company and the largest
information and communications technology ("ICT") equipment provider in the
world, 6 as well as other Chinese state-sponsored actors,' 7 have long implicated
U.S. national security concerns.1 8 In addition to well-documented intellectual
property ("IP") theft,1 9 U.S. policymakers have raised national security concerns
over the Chinese government's purported ability to leverage backdoors in
Huawei's global ICTs to pose cybersecurity threats both at the device and
infrastructure levels. 20 Indeed, Huawei's extensive patent portfolio" itself
presents a significant national security concern. As a telecommunications giant,

Summary Table]; see Duan, supra note 1, at 399 (noting how weak patent policy "can stymie the
government's own ability to achieve national security goals").

Is IP5, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Feb. 10, 2021, 4:32 PM), https://www.uspto.gov/ippolicy/patent-policy/ip5.
16
Lindsay Maizland & Andrew Chatzky, Huawei: China's Controversial
Tech

Giant,

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 6, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/huaweichinas-controversial-tech-giant.
17
See OFF. OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 42 (2011) (noting that ICT

companies Huawei and ZTE (formerly Zhongxing) maintain close ties to the People's Liberation
Army).
See Duan, supra note 1, at 385-86; Daniel Harsha, Huawei, a Self-Made World-Class
or Agent
of China's Global Strategy?, HARV. KENNEDY
SCH.,
https://ash.harvard.edu/huawei-self-made-world-class-company-or-agent-chinas-global-strategy
(last visited Oct. 4, 2021); Maizland & Chatzky, supra note 16.
18

Company

19

See Indictment at 1-2, 19-20, United States v. Huawei Device Co., 2019 WL 653227 (W.D.

Wash. Jan. 16, 2019) (No. 2:19-cr-00010) (alleging that Huawei conspired to steal IP and offered
bonuses to workers who stole confidential information from T-Mobile and companies around the
world).
20
See Bojan Pancevski, U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-say-huawei-can-covertlyaccess-telecom-networks-11581452256; Maizland & Chatzky, supra note 16; infra Part l.A
(discussing how Huawei and other Chinese state-sponsored companies came to pose IP and
cybersecurity concerns).
21

HUAWEI, RESPECT[NG AND PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE FOUNDATION
OF

INNOVATION,
(2019),
/media/corporate/pdf/white%20paper/2019/huaweiwhitepaper
_property.pdfla=en-us [hereinafter HUAWEI WHITE PAPER].

https://www-file.huawei.com/oninnovationand intellectual
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22
Huawei holds over 11,000 U.S. patents and is the global leader in patents that
are essential to the components that deliver 5G technologies. 23 Most recently,
24
after a year of failed negotiations during which Huawei sought over one billion
25
U.S. dollars in royalty fees, Huawei filed suit against Verizon in February
2020.26 Verizon later settled on the eve of trial in the Eastern District of Texas in
mid-2021 for an undisclosed amount.2 7 Given Huawei's quarterly reporting on
licensing revenue, such demands-both public and private-did not stop there.
28
The recent Huawei Technologies Co. v. Verizon Communications Inc.
dispute is but one example that brings the relationship between patents and
national security into focus. 29 When Verizon, a major U.S. internet service
provider, sought to have Huawei's U.S. patents reviewed at the USPTO, the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB") exercised its discretion and denied
consideration of their petitions without considering national security
implications.30
More broadly, Chinese companies have begun to signal they will seek
significant royalties from U.S. companies for 5G smartphone implementations
in particular, with aggressive rate-setting for the level of royalties they intend to

22
23

Id. at 2.
See Duan, supra note 1, at 386 (highlighting how Huawei's 5G patents are essential to global

5G infrastructure).
24
See Sarah Krouse, Huawei Presses Verizon to Payfor Patents, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-presses-verizon-to-pay-for-patents-11560354414.
25
Paul Mozur & Edmund Lee, Huawei Is Said to Demand PatentFees From Verizon, N.Y.
TIMEs (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/technology/huawei-verizon-patentlicense-fees.html. In July 2021, the Huawei-Verizon lawsuit was settled for a confidential sum.
David Shepardson, Huawei, Verizon Agree to Settle Patent Lawsuits, YAHOO! FINANCE (July 12,
2021), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/huawei-verizon-agree-settle-patent-133926986.html.
26
See Original Complaint at 13-17, Huawei Techs. Co. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 2021 WL
150442 (E. D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-00030) (alleging five counts of patent infringement
against Verizon); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 171, Huawei Techs. Co. v. Verizon
Commc'ns, Inc., No. 6:20-cv-00090 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2020) (alleging seven counts of patent
infringement); infra Part II.C (detailing the Huawei v. Verizon dispute and associated national
security concerns).
David Shepardson, Huawei, Verizon Agree to Settle Patent Dispute, REUTERS (July 12,
27
2021, 11:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactiona/huawei-verizon-agree-settlepatent-lawsuits-sources-2021-07-12/.
28

No. 2:20-CV-00030, 2020 WL 7134088 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2020).
See Charles Duan, Do Patents Protect National Security?, LAwFARE (July 12, 2019, 8:20

29
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-patents-protect-national-security (noting how threats
disincentivizing investment in technological innovation could pose a national security threat).
30

Jonathan Stroud, Patent Filings Roundup: PTAB Denies Verizon in Favor of Huawei, IP
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/02/03/patent-filings-roundup-

WATCHDOG

ptab-denies-verizon-favor-huawei-patent-paycheck-program-rock-agis/id=129681/.
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seek from implementers, the majority of whom by market share are U.S.-based. 31
Although to date, national security concerns involving cybersecurity, 5G
technology, and IP theft have been the focus of much analysis throughout the
Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, Huawei's aggressive assertion of
patents along with past examples of bad behavior from ZTE, HTC, and other
companies linked with the PRC's governing leadership32 suggests that aggressive
U.S. patent protection is enabling state-sponsored actors to affect national
security by tying up U.S. companies in U.S. courts to extract those firms'
resources, which pulls them away from both profitability and from further
investment in technological innovation. 33 Indeed, Huawei's first-ever reported
quarterly revenue from patent licensing topped international rivals Ericsson and
Nokia in 2021, amounting to just over $600 million, which is evidence their focus
has shifted, at least in part, from competition in international markets to
licensing.34
While international agreements rightfully prohibit the USPTO from
discriminating against foreign applicants, 35 the U.S. cannot be blind to the fact
that patents are already serving as a strategic tool for international competitors
to harass American companies in court, draining their financial resources by
extracting royalty fees and settlements that flow into overseas coffers. 36 And
because the U.S. government has no effective means to record, or even internally
track, the number or identity of patents international companies own, license, or
could assert in even sensitive technologies, the extent and potentially negative

3

David Kirton, Huawei Announces Royalty Ratesfor 5G Phone Technology, REUTERS (Mar.

16, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-tech/huawei-announces-royalty-rates-

for-5g-phone-technology-idUSKBN2B814X.
32
Companies like HTC and ZTE were the subject of ITC investigations and cross-licensing
fights over 4G that have continued for years, among other regulatory and litigation issues they have
faced. ZTE, in particular, ended up in the U.S. government's crosshairs both for patent and general
security issues. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., ZTE Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty
and Pay Over $430.4 Million for Violating U.S. Sanctions by Sending U.S.-Origin Items to Iran
(Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/zte-corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-and-payover-4304-million-violating-us-sanctions-sending.
3

Duan, supra note 1, at 387.

34
Huawei Announces 2021 Q1 Business Results, Business Remains Resilient, HUAWE (Apr.
28,
2021),
https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2021/4/huawei-ql-2021-business-results
("Huawei's net profit margin was up 3.8 percentage points year-on-year at 11.1%-the result of
the company's ongoing efforts to improve quality of operations and management efficiency, as
well as a patent royalty income of US$600 million.").

"

35
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
322 ("Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less [favorable]
than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property ....
(footnote omitted)).
36
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
37

https://www.aipla.org/detail/journal-issue/2015-report-of-the-economic-survey

to settle due to prohibitively high cost of patent litigation).

(2015),

(noting incentive
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37
ramifications of this problem are not well understood. At a minimum, the U.S.
government should know who owns the patents it issues.
So, what can the U.S. government, and the USPTO in particular, do to
address, mitigate, or, at a minimum, better understand the magnitude of this
issue? Plenty.
Part II of this comment details the major steps the U.S. government took,
largely under the Trump administration, to address cybersecurity threats and why
these actions forced Huawei away from cross-licensing and toward purely
asserting its patents. This worrying trend is exemplified by Huawei v. Verizon,
38
which serves as a case study and implicates grave national security concerns.
Part II also describes the nature of Huawei's patent portfolio and why Huawei's
patents are well-suited for litigation, outlining how the lack of recordation affects
colorable insight into the scope and nature of the threat. Part III explains why the
current recordation requirements at the USPTO are insufficient, describes a
previous proposal aimed at improving transparency with respect to patent
ownership, 39 and examines how aspects of that abandoned proposal can help
address patent-related national security issues. Finally, in answering what the
USPTO should do to address, mitigate, or, at a minimum, understand the
potential vulnerability of U.S. companies to be sued by foreign patent-holders,
Part IV recommends that the USPTO promulgate a new rule requiring patent
applicants to disclose specific ownership information at the USPTO, including
transfers prior to litigation, or risk abandonment. The goal of requiring
mandatory ownership disclosures is to provide notice to, at the very least, the
U.S. government and its national security apparatus regarding the extent that
international companies own and may seek to assert their patents by licensing or
suing U.S. companies in U.S. courts, and thus gain an economic advantage in
critical technologies. 40 Such a registry, which already exists for land or
automobiles, could reveal the extent to which international companies pose a
threat to domestic technological innovation, industry, and competitiveness-all
essential to U.S. national security.

II.

A.

UNRECORDED AND INCOMPLETE U.S. PATENT OWNERSHIP DATA
POSES NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS

How State-SponsoredForeign Companies Came to Pose IP and
Cybersecurity Concerns: Huawei's Example

To capture the scope and potential of the problem, we look to a current
predominant example of concern: Huawei. Founded in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei, a

3
38
3

See FTC REPORT, supra note 13, at 130.
See Duan, supra note 29.
See Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105 (proposed

Jan. 24, 2014) (considered for codification at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1; currently abandoned).
40
See FTC REPORT, supra note 13, at 129-30.
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former engineer in the People's Liberation Army ("PLA") and current member
of the Chinese Communist Party, Huawei has grown dramatically into a
dominant global force in telecommunications. 4 1 Although initially a reseller and
manufacturer of phone switches, 42 in the early 1990s, Huawei won a contract to
build the first telecommunications network for the PLA. 43 Since, Huawei has
grown to become the world's largest seller of smartphones and provider of
telecommunications equipment, including 5G technology.44 Huawei also has
stated it has more than 197,000 employees and operates in more than 170
countries and regions.45
Meanwhile, Congress has posed concerns regarding Huawei and other
state-sponsored companies as early as 2010.46 Subsequently, in 2012, following
an extensive investigation into Huawei's corporate activities, the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence published a report finding, inter
alia, that Huawei (1) did not fully cooperate with the investigation, (2) was
unwilling to explain its relationship with the Chinese government and Chinese
Communist Party, (3) likely remains dependent on the Chinese government for
support, and (4) admits that the Chinese government maintains a committee

4'
42

Maizland & Chatzky, supra note 16.
See Harsha, supra note 18.

43
Bruce Gilley, Huawei'sFixed Line to Beijing, FARE. ECON. REV., Jan. 4, 2001, at 95 (noting
that one employee described this deal as "small in terms of our overall business, but large in terms
of our relationships"); OFF. OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 17, at 42 and accompanying text.
44
Maizland & Chatzky, supra note 16; Sherisse Pham, Samsung Slump Makes Huawei the
World's Biggest Smartphone Brand for the First Time, Report Says, CNN (July 30, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/30/tech/huawei-samsung-q2-hnk-intl/index.htm (revealing that for
first time Huawei overtook Samsung to become the world's number one smartphone seller).
45
Corporate Information, HUAWEI.COM, https://www.huawei.com/us/corporate-information
(last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
46
See Letter from Senator Jon Kyl to Julius Genachowski, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Chairman
(Oct. 19, 2010), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/congressional-leaders-citetelecommunications-concerns-with-firms-that-have-ties-with-chinese-government
(expressing
concern "that [Huawei and ZTE] are being financed by the Chinese government and are potentially
subject to significant influence by the Chinese military which may create an opportunity for
manipulation of switches, routers, or software embedded in American telecommunications
network[s] .... This would pose a real threat to our national security."). But see HUAWEI CYBER
SEC. EVALUATION CTR. OVERSIGHT BD., A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER OF THE

UNITED
KINGDOM
§ 3.18
(Mar.
2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file

/790270/HCSEC_OversightBoardReport-2019.pdf (finding that risks of Huawei technologies
stem from "[p]oor software engineering and cybersecurity processes," not intentional espionage
channels as "a result of Chinese state interference"); Stephanie Zable, Huawei Technologies v.
U.S.:
Summary
and
Context,
LAwFARE
(Apr.
9,
2019,
8:03
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/huawei-technologies-v-us-summary-and-context
(noting
how
Huawei's complaint accused Congress of "singling out" Huawei on "unsubstantiated and largely
unarticulated concerns").
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47
within Huawei, all of which could undermine U.S. national security. The report
also alleged that Huawei has "purposely used ... patented products of other
companies. "4 The United States Trade Representative ("USTR") has also
criticized the Chinese government for using state-sponsored entities as vehicles
for foreign direct investment in Europe and the U.S., through which China has
acquired IP in several industries, including telecommunications. 49 More recently,
in a 2018 Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, agency chiefs warned that
50
Since at least 2018, the U.S.
Huawei could conduct cyber espionage.
been abuzz with the "Military
have
circles
government and scholarly policy
just another way to say that
is
Civilian Fusion" of Chinese interests, which
or indirectly controlled
directly
China's purportedly civilian businesses are often
by the military or at a minimum, contribute to the military's national goals."
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted the 2019 National
Defense Authorization Act ("2019 NDAA"), which included a provision entitled

47
See MIKE ROGERS & DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER OF H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTEL.,
112TH CONG., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE 1, 12-32 (Oct. 8, 2012) [hereinafter ROGERS

& RUPPERSBERGER] (finding that Huawei has shown a pattern of "reckless disregard for the
intellectual property rights of other entities"); Maizland & Chatzky, supra note 16 (providing that
Huawei received over $222 million in government subsidies in 2018).
48
ROGERS & RUPPERSBERGER, supra note 47, at 32 (finding Cisco source code in Huawei's
products and recommending that sensitive U.S. systems, particularly government systems and
contractors, should exclude Huawei's and ZTE's products).

&

&

Jyh-An Lee, Shifting IP Battlegrounds in the US.-China Trade War, 43 COLUM. J.L.
49
ARTS 147, 157 (2020); Soniya Shah, The Problem With Foreign Investment: Using CFIUS
FIRRMA to Prevent Unauthorized Foreign Access to Intellectual Property, 6 ADMIN. L. REv.
ACCORD 1, 2 (2020) (noting how direct investment enables foreign entities "to bypass U.S.
regulatory procedures" and allows IP theft via technology transfer from one country to another);
Maizland & Chatzky, supra note 16 (describing how Huawei underbid Ericsson by 60% to provide
national 5G network equipment for Belgium).
50
Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Intell., 115th Cong.
65 (2018) (describing the risks of allowing any entity beholden to foreign governments to gain
positions of power inside domestic telecommunications networks that would enable them to go
undetected and maliciously modify or steal information); John Boyens, Celia Paulsen, Rama
Moorthy, & Nadya Bartol, SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR FEDERAL
INFORMATION

SYSTEMS

AND

ORGANIZATIONS,

NIST,

SP

800-161

at

iii

(2015),

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-161.pdf (noting that Federal
agencies were concerned about vulnerabilities associated with ICT products that may contain
malicious functionality and present opportunity for ICT compromises).
The term is so in vogue the State Department has released a helpful one-pager on the topic.
51
See Military-Civil Fusion and the People's Republic of China, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
(last visited
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf
Oct. 4, 2021). While saying little itself, the use of the term clearly evinces a growing awareness
and concern for the blurred lines between national and private interests in the PRC. For some
relevant commentary using the term liberally, see e.g., Lorand Laskai, Civil-Military Fusion and
the PLA 's Pursuitof Dominance in Emerging Technologies, JAMESTOWN FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2018,
https://jamestown.org/program/civil-military-fusion-and-the-plas-pursuit-ofAM),
6:00
dominance-in-emerging-technologies/.
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"Section 899" that prohibits the federal government, government contractors,
and grant and loan recipients from procuring or using "covered
telecommunications equipment or services" as a substantial, essential, or critical
component of any system.52 The U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC") also
placed Huawei on its "Entity List," which restricts American firms' ability to
transact with Huawei.53 The USPTO is an office within the DOC. 4
Together, these restrictions exclude Huawei from being able to sell most
of its smartphones and 5G infrastructure equipment in the U.S. market (with
notable ongoing exceptions for largely rural infrastructure), and force Huawei to
resort to asserting its U.S. patents in federal court to create new revenue streams
while fighting for international adoption worldwide-a fight they are far from
losing.55 At the same time, while not in direct response, Huawei has reportedly
and quietly amassed what is most likely the biggest U.S. patent portfolio in 5G
technologies, 56 has recently announced it will be seeking a $2.50/device

52
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 1917 (defining "covered telecommunications equipment" to explicitly include
products made by Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hangzhou Hikvision, and Dahua (Chinese companies)
and their subsidiaries, effectively cutting off the companies' ability to transact in the U.S.); see

also Huawei Techs. USA, Inc. v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 3d 607, 653-54 (E.D. Tex. 2020)
(ruling in favor of the U.S., concluding that Congress acted within its powers when it eliminated
Huawei's ability to transact in the U.S).
5
Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 84 Fed. Reg. 22961-68 (May 16, 2019) (codified as
15 C.F.R. § 744, Supp. 4 (2021)) (providing that the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in the

DOC amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding Huawei to the Entity List);
15 C.F.R. § 744, Supp. 4 (requiring that entities subject to this provision obtain a license to "export,
reexport, or transfer (in-country) any item subject to the EAR"); see also Dan Strumpf, U.S. Weighs
Export Controls on China's Top Chip Maker, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2020, 2:43 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-weighs-export-controls-on-chinas-top-chip-maker11599324489 (noting that the U.S. considers adding Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corp., a Chinese company, to the Entity List).
5
US.
Patent
and
Trademark
Office,
U.S.
DEP'T
https://www.commerce.gov/bureaus-and-offices/uspto (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).

OF

COM.,

5
According to at least Huawei themselves, they now undergird over 50% of worldwide 5G
networks-including networks that have ostensibly and publicly "banned" them, like the U.S.,
U.K, and many of their various strategic allies. See Ellen Nakashima & William Booth, Britain
Bars Huaweifrom Its 5G Wireless Networks, Partof a Growing Shift Awayfrom the Chinese Tech
Giant,WASH. POST (July 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/britain-tobar-huawei-from-its-5g-wireless-networks-part-of-a-growing-shift-away-from-the-chinese-tech-

giant/2020/07/13/44f6afee-c448-11ea-b037-f9711f89ee46_story.html;
Juan Pedro Thomas,
Huawei Claims to Be Involved in Half of Global 5G Networks, RCR WIRELESs NEWs (Feb. 22,
2021),
https://www.rcrwireless.com/20210222/5g/huawei-claims-involved-half-global-5gnetworks. To demonstrate how wide-ranging that fight has gone, note that Romania is the latest
nation to wade in, releasing a bill banning Huawei from their local network. See Reuters & Radusorin Marinas, Romania Approves Bill to Bar China, Huawei from 5G Networks, REUTERS (Apr.
15, 2021, 8:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/romanian-govt-approvesbill-bar-china-huawei-5g-networks-2021-04-15/.
56
See Who Is Leading the 5G Race?, IPLYTIcS (2021), https://www.iplytics.com/report/5gpatent-race-02-2021/ (using patent data to demonstrate Huawei's leadership in 5G patenting); see
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57
licensing royalty rate from handset providers, and has outlined plans for its own
6G technology to launch by 2030.58 Clearly, Huawei plans to, in accord with the
PRC's governing principles and directives, compete broadly with (and possibly
dominate) more traditional Western interests on the soon-dominant nextgeneration wireless standard.
As to questions as to the correlation between ersatz private Chinese
companies and the Chinese government, the PRC recently announced it is
forcing massive international player Ant Group to restructure as (effectively) a
government subsidiary, 59 coupled with a fine of 18.2 billion yuan ($2.8 billion)
60
levied by China's State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), which
shows the power and influence the PRC continues to wield over putative
independent entities operating there.

B. Huawei's Massive U.S. PatentPortfolio
A recent Huawei white paper, published in 2019, self-reports that "[a]s
of the end of 2018, Huawei [owned] 87,805 global patents, of which 11,152 were
61
granted in the U.S. and 6,600 ... were granted in Europe." Huawei's global

also David Sacks, China'sHuawei Is Winning the Race. Here's What the United States Should Do
AM),
3:00
2021,
29,
(Mar.
REL.
FOREIGN
Respond., COUNCIL ON
to

https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-huawei-5g.
Huawei to Start Demanding 5G Royalties from Apple, Samsung, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar.
57
2

16, 2021, 8:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 021-03-16/huawei-to-startdemanding-5g-royalties-from-smartphone-giants; see generally Huawei Released Innovative 5G
Microwave 50gbps Solution to Continuously Build a Simplified, Ultra-Broadband,and Easy-to2020),
25,
(Feb.
HUAWELCOM
Network,
Transport
5G
Deploy
(touting
https://www.huawei.com/us/news/2020/2/innovative-5g-microwave-50gbps-solution
further innovations in 5G technologies).
See, e.g., Matthew Humphries, Huawei Plans to Launch 6G in 2030, PC MAG. (Apr. 15,
5
2021), https://www.pcmag.com/news/huawei-plans-to-launch-6g-in-2030.
See Laura He, Ant Group Cut Down to Size in Latest Blow for Jack Ma's Business Empire,
59
CNN Bus. (Apr. 13, 2021, 5:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/13/tech/ant-grouprestructuring-intl-hnk/index.html.

See Tracy Qu & Minghe Hu, China Antitrust: Alibaba Promises to Assist Regulators to
Maintain 'Market Order'After Record Fine, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 16, 2021, 12:32 PM),
60

https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3129792/china-antitrust-alibaba-promises-assistregulators-maintain-market.
HUAWEI WHITE PAPER, supra note 21, at 18; see Joff Wild, Samsung Owns the Biggest US
61
Patent Portfolio, Beating IBM into Second Place, New Research Reveals, IAM MEDIA (Mar. 29,
2018), https://www.iam-media.com/patents/samsung-owns-biggest-us-patent-portfolio-beatingibm-second-place-new-research-reveals (highlighting that Samsung has the largest U.S. patent
portfolio, with over 75,000 granted patents, followed by IBM, with 46,000); Ingrid Lunden, US
Patents Hit Record 333,530 Granted in 2019; IBM, Samsung (Not the FAANGs) Lead the Pack,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 14, 2020. 6:57 AM), https://social.techcrunch.com/2020/01/14/us-patents-hit(noting that as of
record-333530-granted-in-2019-ibm-samsung-not-the-faangs-lead-the-pack/
2019, Huawei sits at number ten in the U.S. for most patent applications, with 2,418 filed
applications, behind well-known companies like IBM (9,262) and Samsung (6,469)).
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efforts to acquire an extensive patent portfolio are evident: in 2018, Huawei
submitted 5,405 patent filings at the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), the highest figures ever recorded. 62 Moreover, as of the end of 2019,
for the first time, China overtook the U.S. as the biggest source of international
patent applications at the WIPO.63 This global trend follows the U.S. one-in
each of the years since 2011, the majority of patents granted at the USPTO have
been granted to foreign companies.
Given that the U.S. offers widely
recognized, comparatively robust patent protection, 65 the fact that the majority
of U.S. patent recipients are international companies strongly evidences the need
for the USPTO to track the extent that international patent-holders can use U.S.
courts to enforce their patents. The U.S. patent system has already long been the
target of companies like Huawei, who may be otherwise blocked from competing
in the U.S. market as a result of transaction restrictions imposed by the U.S.
government. 66 The incentives for such a company skew heavily toward
widespread enforcement against U.S. companies, either to secure substantial
worldwide royalties and market share or to extract rents after being excluded
from said markets.
According to a recent analysis of Huawei's U.S. patents, the vast
majority are of "low value" but are nonetheless of high quality. 67 A subsequent

HUAWEI WHITE PAPER, supra note 21, at 19 (noting that this is "an all-time record by
anyone").
63
Stephanie Nebehay, In a First, China Knocks U.S. from Top Spot in Global
Patent Race,
REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2020, 8:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-patentsidUSKBN21P1P9 (explaining that "[WIPO], which oversees a system for countries to share
recognition of patents, said 58,990 applications were filed from China last year, beating out the
62

United States which filed 57,840"). For a discussion on whether China truly dominates global
innovation when a significant portion of its patents are state-subsidized to meet governmentmandated filing targets, see Jonathan Putnam, Hieu Luu, & Ngoc Ngo, Does China Really

Dominate Global Innovation? The Impact of China's Subsidized Patent Application System,
HUDSON INST. (Mar. 14, 2021), https://www.hudson.org/research/16777-does-china-reallydominate-global-innovation-the-impact-of-china-s-subsidized-patent-application-system.
See Statistics Summary Table, supra note 14.
See generally Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 6; see also Daniel Rechtschaffen, How
China's Legal System Enables Intellectual Property Theft, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://thediplomat.com/2020/11 /how-chinas-legal-system-enables-intellectual-property-theft/
(providing that despite China's recent improvements in IP protection resulting from the US-China
trade deal, "structural flaws in China's legal system ensure that a comprehensive U.S.-style IP
protection system will forever remain a mirage in the eyes of foreign corporations").
66
See infra Part II.C (overviewing the implications of Huawei v. Verizon and associated
national security concerns).
6

65

67
Huawei's Future from a Patent Perspective, INQUARTIK (July 9, 2019),
https://www.inquartik.com/inq-huawei-patent-analysis-part-1/
[hereinafter Patent Portfolio].
While low-value patents reflect poor economic upside, high-quality patents are difficult to
invalidate during litigation; and designating nearly 65% of Huawei's patents as high-qualityeither in the "A", "AA", or "AAA" categories. Id. Interestingly, as of April 2020, China began
cracking down on low-quality patent-filing activity in its own national system and subjecting all
Chinese patent applications to higher scrutiny. See Jacob Schindler, Large IP Platform Feels the
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quality analysis of Huawei's fourth-generation ("4G") and 5G U.S. standardessential patents ("SEPs") 68 revealed that a majority of Huawei's 4G SEPs are
considered high-quality, and nearly three-quarters of Huawei's 5G SEPs are
high-quality. 69 Per those analyses, whereas low-quality patents require extensive
litigation to delineate the proper scope of their claims, high-quality patents
70
indicate that the scopes are well-defined. Claims are the part of the patent
71
application that states what is to be legally protected and enforceable in court.
Therefore, companies such as Huawei, which possess high-quality patents, will
likely prevail (or at least abide) in infringement actions against other
companies.72 Taken together with the fact that Huawei is the global leader in 5G
SEPs, 73 the company is well-positioned to demand significant royalty fees and
will likely succeed in court and, perhaps more importantly, in any eventual 5G
patent pool 4 that divvies up royalties among patentholders. Even if excluded
from such revenue streams, Huawei can still likely force near-endless litigation
against U.S. companies allegedly infringing on its patents. Indeed, Huawei has
already earned over 1.4 billion U.S. dollars in royalty fees globally since 2015.75

Heat as China Scrutinizes Patent Service, IAM MEDIA (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.iammedia.com/law-policy/large-ip-platform-feels-the-heat-china-scrutinises-patent-services.

See generally Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How EssentialAre Standard-Essential
68
Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607 (2019) (describing standard-essential patents as patents that
are integral to the implementation of standardized technology; SEPs cover industry standards).
69
YP .ou & Jackson Lin, A Deep Dive into the Quality of Huawei 's 4G and 5G SEP Portfolios,
IAM MEDIA (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/deep-dive-quality-huaweis4g-and-5g-sep-portfolios (finding, based on data gathered from the USPTO, European
Telecommunications Standards Institute, and Inquartik, that 54% of Huawei's 4G SEPs were in
the "A", "AA", and "AAA" categories, and 74% of Huawei's 5G SEPs were in the "A", "AA" and
"AAA" range).
See Robert L. Stoll, The Importance of Issuing High Quality Patents, THE HILL (Oct. 24,
70
2016, 6:56 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/302593-the-importance-ofissuing-high-quality-patents (noting that whereas vague claim boundaries, less than enabling
disclosures and poorly written documents plague the patent system, improved patent quality
ensures stronger protections).
?1

Id.

72

See Gerson S. Panitch, What Makes Some PatentsMore Powerful Than Others? Finnegan's
2019),
MAG.
(Dec.
CYBER
HAARETZ
Secret
Ingredients,
Two
https://www. finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/what-makes-some-patents-more-powerful-thanothers-finnegans-two-secret-ingredients.html (describing how strong patent protections discourage
infringement activity).
73

HUAWEI WHITE PAPER, supra note 21, at 22 (noting that Huawei owns 21% of all 5G SEPs).

74

See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PATENT POOLS AND ANTITRUST-A COMPARATIVE

https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip(2014),
3-4
ANALYSIS
competition/en/studies/patentpoolsreport.pdf (defining patent pools as agreements between two
or more patent owners to license their patents to each another or to third parties).
75

Patent Portfolio, supra note 67.
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C. U.S. PatentLiability as a National Security Risk: Huawei v. Verizon
After the generalized exclusion from the U.S. market, Huawei turned its
attention to large-scale enforcement against U.S. service providers. After months
of demanding licensing fees from Verizon, 76 including threats that prompted a
tweet from U.S. Senator Marco Rubio,77 in February 2020, Huawei filed two
lawsuits against Verizon, both alleging patent infringement.7 8 In the Western
District of Texas, 79 Huawei accused Verizon of knowingly using Huawei's
patented technology without a license through third-party vendors, claiming that
Verizon provides services and technologies that infringe on Huawei's patents. 80
This first suit accused Verizon of infringing seven Huawei-owned patents
relating to video communication technologies and signal-processing methods. 8 1
On the same day, Huawei also sued Verizon in the Eastern District of Texas,
alleging infringement on five patents that relate to industry standards for optical
transport network systems, which are used to transmit large amounts of data, 82
technology largely seen as ancillary (if nonetheless important) to core or more
lucrative standards assets. In both complaints, Huawei recounted lengthy failed
licensing negotiations with Verizon that precipitated the lawsuit. 83 Both cases
represent only a small fraction of the patents Huawei could bring to bear if it so
wished.
The cases argued that Huawei is serious about continuing to create
licensing streams through its patent portfolio as an alternative revenue source,
likely due in no small part to being blacklisted in the U.S. market. This is a
natural route for Huawei to take in light of its long history of acquiring U.S.
patents and its history of U.S. licensing activity since at least 2015.84 Put simply,
Huawei v. Verizon is likely a harbinger of what is to come-a warning shot fired

76

See Mozur & Lee, supra note 25.

77
Marco
Rubio
(@marcorubio),
TWITrER
(June
18,
https://twitter.com/marcorubio/status/1 140968813976006658?lang-en.

2019,

9:05

AM),

78
See Original Complaint, supra note 26, at 13-17; Complaint for Patent Infringement, supra
note 26, at 171 (alleging seven counts of patent infringement).
79

Paul R. Gugliuzza & J. Jonas Anderson, How the West Became the East: The Patent

Litigation Explosion in the Western District of Texas,

PATENTLY-O

(Sept.

https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/09/litigation-explosion-district.htm
(highlighting
Western District of Texas has become the go-to forum for patent litigation).

15, 2020),
why

the

80
Complaint For Patent Infringement, supra note 26, at 10-11 (alleging infringement for
utilizing and incorporating "network infrastructure such as Cisco Integrated Service Routers,
Aggregation Services Routers, Network Convergence Systems, Nexus Switches, Catalyst
Switches, Clouds Services Router 1000v series" and through distribution and reselling of "services
such as Cisco Webex, and the distribution of applications such as the Smart Family application

and the One Talk application").
81
Id.
82
See Original Complaint, supra note 26, at 4.
83
Id. at 11-12.
84

Patent Portfolio, supra note 67.

PAPER OF RECORD

2022]

463

at the intersection of patent policy and national security. The dispute implicates
an entirely different national security threat: namely, international statesponsored actors flooding U.S. courts and suing U.S. companies based on U.S.
patents. Litigation costs alone will drain resources from sound financial
85
investments in domestic innovation and redirect American resources to costly
86
litigation or licensing payments. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the problem
is not well understood by anyone in the U.S., given the inadequate recordation
requirements at the USPTO. 87
Indeed, absent private reports and incomplete private third-party
analyses, no one in the Federal Government seems to know just how many
patents Huawei and other foreign state actors own, acquire, or can assert, making
it difficult to even study the problem, much less formulate national security
policy. That fault can be squarely laid at the feet of the U.S.'s inadequate patent
ownership recordation system.
The problem is one Congress has recently sought to address through
legislation. For instance, Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Patrick Leahy (DVT) submitted a bill amendment in 2021 that would have, inter alia, created a
foreign-ownership patent registry recording the assignment of any patent interest
greater than 10% for a particular asset to a foreign entity within 90 days of the
assignment to that entity. These amendments were abandoned with all others
88
when the national security bill was passed without amendment. Later, Senators
Leahy and Tillis introduced the "Pride in Patent Ownership Act," a similar
measure that would, as they put it, ensure "that the public has access to
89
information about the true owner of a patent." The full text requires patent
applicants to note, if true, that they are doing so at the behest of a governmental
entity (or the maintenance fees are being paid or funded by a governmental
entity). 90 It generally has the same requirements as the earlier-submitted
amendment, including the 90-day window, and would require the USPTO to
91
create a digitally searchable public database of those records.

Ouellette & Williams, supra note 11, at 5 (emphasizing the need for innovation to help drive
85
the U.S. economy).
86
Duan, supra note 1, at 385-87.
87

FTC REPORT, supra note 13, at 130.

See Brachman Steve, Leahy-Tillis Amendments to Endless Frontier Act Opposed by
2021),
26,
(May
WATCHDOG
IP
Group,
Advocacy
Inventor
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021 /05/26/leahy-tillis-amendments-endless-frontier-act-opposedinventor-advocacy-group/id=13 3969/.
See Press Release, Tillis and Leahy Introduce Bipartisan Bills to Boost American Innovation
89
88

2

(Sept. 21 2021), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/20 1/9/tillis-and-leahy-introduce-bipartisan-billsto-boost-american-innovation.
Pride in Patent Ownership Act, S. 2774, 117th Cong. (2021).
90
91

Id. § 124.
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RECORDATION REQUIREMENTS AT THE USPTO AND THE
PROPOSED RULE

Insufficient Recordation Leads to PoorNotice

The patent system is ostensibly designed to provide notice about
ownership of patent rights, as U.S. patents generate strict liability claims that
otherwise require no real notice prior to suit. 92 But today, the U.S. patent system
faces widescale low-quality recordation, incomplete assignments and transfer
records, and unclear or purposefully obfuscated patent ownership. 93 It is common
for courts to grapple with complaints where the party suing and the party
recorded as owner differ, and much money and time is spent by the courts trying
(and often failing) to sort out ownership issues. A lack of transparent ownership
records imposes heavy burdens on the patent system due to ensuing litigation
costs to determine who owns the patent, the proper scope of the claims, and
whether royalties should be paid. 94 Although the America Invents Act ("AIA")
attempted to improve some methods for identifying the rightful owner of patent
rights, unclear ownership disputes over patents persist and continue to spur heavy
litigation costs. 95 Unclear ownership hides the picture of who is really benefiting
from the U.S. patent marketplace. More importantly, it makes it impossible for
our national security officials to monitor threats or even know if our own patent
system is being used or abused against us.
The problem has long been identified, and government officials have
tried and failed to address it in any meaningful way. For instance, in 2014, the
USPTO published a proposed rule ("Proposed Rule") and accompanying notice
of proposed rulemaking to require specific ownership disclosures. 96 While the

92

Ouellette & Williams, supra note 11, at 11.

9
See generally Nathan P. Anderson, Striking a Balance: The Pursuit of TransparentPatent
Ownership, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 395 (2015) (describing how many burdensome costs stem
from low-quality patents and lack of transparent ownership); see also Robin Feldman,
Transparency, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 272 (2014).
94
See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 13 at 127-30; Anderson, supra note 93, at 398, 401
(noting how incomplete or hidden ownership information enables nonpracticing entities (NPEs)
from extracting settlements by engaging in costly litigation); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas
Melamed, Missing the Forestfor the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2124-25, 2145-46 (2013)
(stating that "[p]atent trolls" are NPEs who abuse the patent system through licensing and litigation
by sitting on their patents in order to sue alleged infringers rather than patenting new technologies);
Jonathan Stroud, PullingBack the Curtainon Complex Funding ofPatentAssertion Entities, 12.2
LANDSLIDE

20 (2019) (highlighting that untangling NPE ownership is difficult even for industry

insiders).

&

95
See Anderson, supra note 93, at 405 ("The [AIA] included provisions to improve clarity
with regard to real party-in-interest.").
96
See Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105, 4106 (Jan.
24, 2014) (considered for codification at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1; currently abandoned) (noting that a goal
of the Proposed Rule was to ensure that the USPTO could provide accurate and non-misleading
information concerning published patent applications and issued patents); see Ouellette
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97
administration withdrew this proposal without further action, its model serves
as a useful starting point to address the national security concerns affecting patent
law. And as noted above, while Congress has and is currently attempting to
address the problem via legislation, all attempts to pass even moderate
improvements to the recordation system have either failed (the 2021 bill
amendment) or are meeting with resistance (the Pride in Patent Ownership
Act.)98 Indeed, at a recent hearing, speakers suggested that even these mild
99
reforms might be too onerous for rightsholders to comply with.
Just as clarifying unclear ownership issues would place interested parties
on notice with respect to ownership, requiring disclosures at the time of patent
filing (as the Pride in Patent Ownership Act does) would similarly inform the
USPTO regarding the extent to which various international companies receive
U.S. patents.100 In the context of national security, a database comprised of even
just foreign patent-holders could be the first step in understanding the extent to
which international companies like Huawei (or more directly, sovereign national
entities or foreign governments) might assert U.S. patents in U.S. courts. This
database would allow the U.S. government to gauge whether any foreign
governments are attempting to subvert the U.S. patent system against the U.S.,
10 1
as occurred in 2018 with trademark registrations. And, in the broader context
of domestic patent policy, a comprehensive registry would promote clear
ownership notice, facilitate unhampered patent licensing, decrease costs
associated with identifying interested parties, and diminish the risk of litigation
that straddles the patent system with overhead cost.

Williams, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that the Proposed Rule's primary focus was to improve
ownership by targeting shell companies who purposefully obfuscate their ownership information
and file frivolous suits to extract hefty settlement fees).
See Ouellette & Williams, supra note 11, at 13 (noting that the Proposed Rule failed because
97
patent holders were concerned about increased regulatory costs).
See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. See also Dennis Crouch, Pride in Patent
98
2
Ownership Act, PATENTLYO (Sept. 21, 2021), https://patentlyo.com/patent/20 1/09/pride-patentownership.html.
See generally Pride in Patent Ownership: The Value of Knowing Who Owns a Patent:
99
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong.

(2021).

100

Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4108 (Jan. 24,

2014) (considered for codification at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1; currently abandoned) (citing the USPTO's
duty to inform the public by collecting and disseminating information about patent ownership); see
FTC REPORT, supra note 13 at 130 (noting how the USPTO provides poor notice of patent
ownership due to failures to record ownership changes and due to a lack of standardized ownership
designations).
101
See Gershman, supra note 5.
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"Attributable Ownership" and the Proposed Rule

The proposed rule, attached to this paper, solves many of these policy
concerns and would lead to transparency in patent ownership. "Attributable
ownership" as defined in the Proposed Rule includes (1) "titleholders," (2)
"enforcement entities," (3) "ultimate parent entities," and (4) "hidden beneficial
owners." 0 2 "Titleholders" was a relatively narrow category and included entities
who had been assigned title, or ownership, to the patent or patent application. 103
This first category, "titleholders," overlaps with the information that a patent
applicant and patent owners currently may voluntarily submit for recordation at
the USPTO. 104 The second category, "enforcement entities," was a broader
category and included entities who must be necessarily joined in a lawsuit to
have standing to enforce the patent or pending patent.'0 5 The third category,
"ultimate parent entities," was even more broad and included entities who
controlled the first two categories.1 06 The fourth category, "hidden beneficial
owners," included entities avoiding the need for disclosure by temporarily
divesting themselves of ownership rights through contractual agreements to keep
their identities hidden.1 07 Because this category received substantial opposition,
was poorly defined, 08 and is the least applicable to the national security context,
this comment will not analyze "hidden beneficial owners," though we do note
that the evolving law of champerty and the explosion of patent litigation
financing and widespread use of litigation vehicles to obscure ownership render
this an important area for further study.
According to the proposal, entities would disclose attributable
ownership information at several critical points: (1) at the time a patent
application is initially filed, (2) if an ownership change occurs during the
pendency of the application, (3) at the time of issue fee payment, (4) at the time

102

Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4106, 4110.
Id. at 4110.
104
Id. (stating that in the limited circumstances where the exclusive license transfers so many
rights that it is effectively an assignment, the USPTO expects that exclusive licensee information
would more routinely be reported under the enforcement entities category).
105
Id. (explaining that enforcement entities carry the legal right to enforce the patent by
bringing infringement actions).
106
Id. at 4111 (defining "ultimate parent entities" by incorporation of 16 CFR § 801.1(a)(3)
(2012) as "an entity which is not controlled by any other entity." "Control," in turn, is defined by
103

16 CFR § 801.1(b)(1)- (2) (2012), as either (1) "(i) Holding 50 percent or more of the outstanding
voting securities of an issuer, or (ii) . . . having the right to 50 percent or more of the profits of the
entity, or [iii] having the right in the event of dissolution to 50 percent or more of the assets of the
entity;" or (2) "Having the contractual power ...
to designate fifty percent or more of the
directors.").
107

Id.

108

Anderson, supra note 93, at 417.
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each maintenance fee 09 is paid, and (5) at the time the patent becomes involved
0
with certain post-issuance proceedings at the USPTO." Notably, attributable
ownership disclosures would only become mandatory upon commencement of
patent applications at the USPTO, not if the patents were initially filed
internationally at a different patent office."' An applicant who failed to identify
the attributable owner within a given period of time would be non-compliant and
face abandonment." 2 Finally, upon publication or issuance of the patent, the
USPTO would provide "current attributable ownership information, as well as a
history of any changes, in an accessible online format, such as the public side of
the Patent Application Information Retrieval ("PAIR") system."'13 The PAIR
system offers USPTO customers, patent attorneys, patent agents, inventors, and
authorized personnel a way to retrieve and download information regarding
patent application status, as well as access to issued patents and published
applications."4
The proposal failed in large part due to concerns over increased
regulatory costs." 5 Commenters provided several reasons why the "ultimate

OFF.,
TRADEMARK
&
PAT.
U.S.
Patent,
Your
109 Maintain
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/maintain (last visited Oct. 5, 2021) (noting that maintenance fees
are required to keep in force all utility and reissue utility patents and that they are required three to
three-and-a-half years, seven to seven-and-a-half years, and eleven to eleven-and-a-half years after
the date of issuance).
110
Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4110-11.
"
112

Id.

Id. at 4112; Anderson, supra note 93, at 421 (highlighting that while a "good faith"

exception existed, demonstrating good faith errors is nearly impossible, and thus, the exception

would rarely apply).
Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4111 (highlighting
"3
the USPTO's duty to disseminate patent information to the public and duty to provide access to
information electronically); see FTC REPORT, supra note 13, at 88-89, 128-29 (describing
components and benefits of the PAIR system).
14
Check the Filing Status of Your Patent Application, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 5,
2021) https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/checking-application-status/check-filing-status-yourpatent-application.
115
See Letter from Wayne P. Sobon, President, Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n, to Michelle K. Lee,
2014),
24,
(Apr.
2
Off.
Trademark
&
Pat.
U.S.
Dir.,
Deputy

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/comments attributableowner20l4.pdf
(noting that the rules try to address a legitimate concern, but do so through "overly harsh
consequences" and "potentially high burdens on all users of the patent system"); Ryan Davis,
Critics Blast USPTO Patent Transparency Plan At Hearing, LAw360 (Mar. 13, 2014, 6:09 PM
EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/515513/critics-blast-uspto-patent-transparency-plan-athearing (expressing concern with proposal's excessive burdens on patent owners); Letter from
Phyllis T. Tumer-Brim, Vice President, Chief IP Couns. & Russ Merbeth, Chief Pol'y Couns.,
Intellectual Ventures, to James Engel, Senior Legal Advisor, Off. of Pat. Legal Admin., U.S. Pat.

&

Trademark

Off.

at

19

(Apr.

24,

2014),

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/comments-attributableowner2014.pdf#aoe intellectualventures_20140424 (arguing that such disclosures would be a substantial departure
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parent entity" definition was overly broad and inapplicable in the "patent
context."' 16 However, certain aspects of the "ultimate parent entities" category
serve as useful ownership disclosures in the context of international patent
applicants. These, in turn, can enable the USPTO to improve notice of patent
ownership." 7
C. Evaluating the "Ultimate ParentEntity" in the National Security
Context
The Proposed Rule aimed to decrease litigation costs by clarifying
ownership transparency. 1 8 Although the proposal was poorly tailored to mitigate
litigation abuse' 9'or address national security concerns and might have increased
regulatory costs for frequent patentees or large companies of all stripes, 2 0
elements of the proposal regarding ownership disclosures are useful as applied
in the patent national security context. Importantly, the same statutory authority
and internal guidance relied upon by USPTO to promulgate the proposal is
applicable to the international context.121 Adapting and modifying aspects of the
proposal to the international context presents clear advantages over the
proposal's solutions to remedy unclear ownership.
First, many of the attendant regulatory costs disappear. Commenters in
response to the Proposed Rule posed concerns about the regulatory burden of
updating ownership information at various junctures during patent prosecution,
post-issuance proceedings, and during the life of the patent.1 2 2 These checkpoints
increased compliance costs by requiring updated ownership information even in
the absence of an ownership change.' 23 However, in light of national security

from accepted patent practices, in direct opposition to the USPTO's stated policy goal of increasing

harmony in the field).
116
See Anderson, supra note 93, at 415-16 (providing an in-depth analysis of commenters'
concerns regarding the "ultimate parent entity" category).
117
FTC REPORT, supra note13, at 3-4 (describing how notice positively affects innovation).

118 See Anderson, supra note 93, at 395-96 (overviewing the Proposed Rule's goals of
disclosing ownership information when patent applications came before the USPTO).
119 Id. at 426 (describing how the Proposed Rule failed to adequately curb litigation abuse by
not properly shedding light on the parties most using and directing abusive practices).
120
Id. at 410 (noting how the USPTO required ownership disclosures during maintenance fee
payments even after patent prosecution).

121

Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105, 4107-08 (Jan.

24, 2014) (considered for codification at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1; currently abandoned) (quoting 35
U.S.C.A. § 2(b)(2) (West 2021) ("[The USPTO] has the authority to promulgate regulations that

shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office.")) (citing 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(2) (noting the
USPTO's duty to disseminate to the public information regarding patents) (citing Star Fruits S.N.C.

v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).

122

See Anderson, supra note 93, at 419-20, 425.
Id. at 420 (highlighting the disproportionate impact on small businesses who must update
ownership information during the entire life of the patent through maintenance fees). It is worth
123
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concerns, broad disclosures could be limited to fewer triggering events, such as
at the time of (1) the initial filing at the USPTO, (2) the issuance of the patent,
and (3) at any subsequent change in ownership, such as during the transfer of a
patent from one owner to another. There is no need to abandon efforts to improve
recordation entirely based on countervailing cost concerns.
In the national security context, which is less concerned with subsequent
litigation over unclear and low-quality patents, fewer triggering events would
suffice to provide notice of which entities own U.S. patents but would still clarify
ownership. Whereas the proposed rule targeted low-quality and unclear patents
in order to clarify ownership status to lessen litigation expenditures, Huawei's
vast majority of patents are ostensibly of high quality (for assertion purposes, as
we define it, not for validity purposes), meaning that attendant concerns
4
regarding litigation costs relating to low-quality patents do not exist.1 This does
not mean that Huawei would not still file suit against companies; they would be
free to do so, and nothing in this rule would set up any impediments to
enforcement of duly recorded rights. Rather, as long as the USPTO has notice of
the correct owner, the extent to which Huawei could sue would simply be known,
at a minimum, to the U.S. government agency issuing the assets. While some
commenters questioned the USPTO's authority to mandate updated ownership
disclosures in the absence of "touchpoints" with the USPTO (e.g., when
maintenance fees are paid)" 5-which disregards their broad authority to issue
and manage the rights in the first place)-the USPTO could simply rely on its
duty to disseminate accurate and non-misleading information regarding patents
to require updated ownership disclosures when patents are transferred after
issuance-a surely laudable goal that falls squarely within its currently
recognized procedural powers.
Second, criticisms levied at the CFR's incorporated language defining
"ultimate parent entity" can be circumvented in the national security context by
employing a more tailored definition. Although the incorporated language was
designed to reach through complex ownership structures to prevent
anticompetitive behavior,1 26 the definition was too broad to specifically target
entities who were most abusing litigation by purposefully obfuscating ownership
information. 2 7 While the "ultimate parent entity" defmition was overly broad to
noting that those regulatory burdens would fall largely onto the shoulders of the biggest users of
the patent system and seem a fair trade-off for the valuable rights afforded frequent patentees.
124
See infra Part IIl.D (discussing the persisting licensing and financing issues with the

Proposed Rules).
125
See Anderson, supra note 93, at 422-24 (briefly detailing that superior proposals involving
broader disclosures were perhaps outside of the USPTO's procedural justifications under 35 U.S.C.
§ 2(b)(2) but asserting no conclusion).
126
Id. at 424 (explaining how the incorporated CFR language was designed to reach through
complex ownership schemes to prevent large, anticompetitive mergers).

&

127
See id. at 415-16, 424-26 (describing how the incorporated language was simultaneously
overinclusive and underinclusive, adversely affecting the financing activities of companies who
were least likely to abuse litigation while failing to reach companies who do); Ouellette
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adequately target non-practicing entities ("NPEs") 128 for purposes of curbing
patent litigation abuse, the defmition pointed to the types of entities that could
potentially pose a threat by leveraging their massive patent portfolios.
In the context of national security, the types of entities that pose threats
are those which stand to benefit the most from licensing disputes, such as
Huawei.1 29 Due to criticisms over the "ultimate parent entities" language, a more
suitable definition could better serve as a disclosure requirement. 10 Under
section 16a-2 of the Securities and Exchange Act, 131 any directors, officers, and
beneficial owners of over ten percent of equity securities in a company must
make financial disclosures with the Security and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
when dealing with a transaction.13 2 A beneficial owner is "any person who,
directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding,
relationship or otherwise" possesses or shares with others voting power or
investment power in the control of securities. 33 Applied to the national security
context, beneficial ownership disclosures can indicate who stands to benefit from
asserting a patent and where the money would flow.' 34 By tailoring ownership
disclosures to record who stands to benefit from asserting a patent, the USPTO

Williams, supra note 11, at 12 (outlining the debate between technology firms that argued that the
definition was too broad to curb abusive behavior, and "pharmaceutical firms, universities, the
Intellectual Property Owners Association ('IPO') and the American Intellectual Property Law
Association ('AIPLA')," which argued that the proposed reform would be too burdensome and
could violate confidential licensing terms). Id.

128

See sources cited supra note 94 (describing NPEs).

129

HUAWEI WHITE PAPER, supra note 21, at 2 (highlighting Huawei's self-reported 11,152-

owned U.S patents).
130

131

See generally Feldman, supra note 93.
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2021).

See generally Feldman, supra note 93, at 304-10 (outlining the 1991 overhaul to the
Security and Exchange Act, under which "beneficial ownership" disclosures include a "threshold"
disclosure requirement under section 13(d) and a second disclosure requirement under section
16(a), which turns on the concept of "pecuniary interest" defined as the "'opportunity, directly or
indirectly, to profit or share in any profit derived from a transaction in the subject securities"' Id.
132

at 308-09 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)). Notably, section 16 only applies to shareholders
who can influence or control a company and exempts from the "beneficial ownership" category
certain people and institutions who own equity for reasons unrelated to control or influence. Id. at

309 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(a)(2)(iii)). Also, "beneficial ownership" arises in an anticipatory
manner, meaning that one becomes a beneficial owner once the right to acquire the shares within

60 days has been established. Id. at 306 (citing 17 C.F.R. §240.13d-3(d)(1)(i)). Finally,
corporations, subsidiaries, partnerships, LLCs, and other entities can also be beneficial owners and
can be penalized for evading disclosures if found to have created an ownership structure to avoid
disclosure. Id. at 306-07.; Officers, Directorsand 10% Shareholders, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N

(Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/officersanddirectors (describing
that "[b]eneficial ownership" reporting under 13(d) requires filing by shareholders who have a
right to acquire more than five percent in a company and that "[t]ransaction reporting" under
section 16 requires filing by officers, directors, and ten percent shareholders).

13

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3.

134

See Feldman, supra note 93, at 312.

PAPER OF RECORD

2022]

471

would recognize the extent to which international-patent holders could tie up
U.S. courts and extract money from domestic innovation in technology. While
these former proposals'3 5 aimed to decrease litigation costs by increasing patent
transparency through targeting complex ownership schemes-the problem the
AIA attempted to resolve,' 36 capturing the beneficial owner of domestic and
international patent applicants would at least provide notice regarding patent
ownership and address the information deficit regarding the patent national
security problem. 37
D. PersistingLicensing and FinancingCriticisms of the ProposedRule
In addition to concerns over increased administrative costs,138 the largest
concerns regarding the proposed rule involved the debate between large
technology firms, which believed the proposed rule was not tailored enough to
target NPEs, 3 9 and stakeholders such as pharmaceutical firms, universities, and
the American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA"), which were
40
most concerned over costs to the parties.1 (It is worth noting that administrative
costs would be borne in direct proportion to overall use of-and presumably
benefit from-the system.) Some universities, for example, suggested they
feared breach-of-contract disputes for disclosing various licensees of their
4
patents, as well as diminished royalties. ' Commenters to the Proposed Rule also
voiced concerns that investors might withdraw funding when faced with
disclosure requirements reaching equity investors who own less than a majority
share in a company and who do not exert control over the patent, concerns that
seem overblown in light of similar disclosure requirements by the district and
appellate courts.1 42 Similarly, some small businesses argued against having to
disclose the interest of their creditors, who sometimes use still-pending patent

See e.g., Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105 (Jan.
24, 2014) (considered for codification at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1; currently abandoned).
136
See supra Part III (describing how the AIA sought to improve ownership clarity).
135

137

In keeping with this article's emphasis on foreign ownership disclosures, Senators Thom

Tillis (R-NC) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) submitted a bill amendment that would have, inter alia,
created a foreign-ownership patent registry recording the assignment of any patent interest greater
than 10% for a particular asset to a foreign entity within 90 days of the assignment to that entity.
These amendments were abandoned with all others when the national security bill was passed
without amendment. See Steve Brachman, Leahy-Tillis Amendments to Endless FrontierAct
2021),
(May 26,
IP WATCHDOG
Group,
Opposed by Inventor Advocacy
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021 /05/26/leahy-tillis-amendments-endless-frontier-act-opposedinventor-advocacy-group/id=133969/.
138

Anderson, supra note 93, at 397.

1

See Ouellette & Williams, supra note 11, at 12.

140

Id.

141

See Anderson, supra note 93, at 414 (explaining that the value of university patents would
decrease if parties could not license them under confidentiality obligations).
142
Id. at 416.
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applications as collateral to secure loans.1 43 While most of those interests require
and include disclosure under the current scheme to avoid protracted disputes over
title and under other financial disclosure regulations, they must still be
considered and addressed when proposing any improved disclosure requirements
at the USPTO.
Furthermore, the proposal was unable to narrowly define the financial
beneficiaries of certain patents, making that provision the main sticking point
between the commenters. Since the proposal focused exclusively on identifying
those entities who either owned majority stakes in the patent or those who were
entitled to a majority of the licensing fees, the proposal risked missing nonmajority shareholders who could nonetheless control the patent,144 such as in the
case of "group action."' 4 5 Alternatively, in the litigation context, it is often
difficult to identify those entities that must be joined in a lawsuit in order to have
standing to enforce the patent.1 4 6 Thus, commenters argued that a determination
of necessary parties involves complex analysis of what patents have been
transferred in a given agreement,1 47 a determination they apparently thought too
complex for the agency awarding the patents in the first place. While these patent
licensing and financing-related criticisms may be among the reasons the
Proposed Rule ultimately failed, it is unlikely that similar concerns would be
directed towards more modified, modest ownership disclosure requirements in
the national security context.
The concerns stemming from universities who feared disclosing
licensees, small businesses who feared naming creditors using pending patents
as collateral on loans, and commenters who noted that investors might withdraw
funding when faced with such disclosure requirements find no support in
empirical evidence-but nonetheless could be easily mollified by exempting
these entities from providing certain ownership disclosures at the USPTO, or
from such disclosures from being public. Generally, these entities are not the

143
144
145

Id.

146

See Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105, 4110 (Jan.

Id. at 417.

See Feldman, supra note 93, at 306, 313 (describing group action as two or more entities
acting together for the purpose of controlling shares).

24, 2014) (considered for codification at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1; currently abandoned) (explaining that "in
the limited circumstances where an exclusive license transfers so many rights that it is effectively
an assignment [of the patent]," the USPTO expected that the "enforcement entities" category
would account for parties with an interest to be joined in the litigation).
147
Anderson, supra note 93, at 415 (noting that the highly fact-dependent and complex nature
of these determinations would impose heavy costs on patent owners and applicants and likely
penalize many parties who were not purposefully obfuscating ownership rights); see also Letter
from Corey Salsberg, Senior Legal Couns., Novartis Int'l AG to James Engel, Senior Legal

Advisor,

Off.

of

Legal

Admin.,

USPTO

11-12,

n.8

(Apr.

15,

2014),

https://www.uspto.gov/patentslaw/comments/ao-e_novartis- (noting that determining "whether or
not an exclusive licensee qualifies as an assignee for the purpose of enforcement" varies by
jurisdiction as a result of the interaction between state contract law and federal patent law).
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types of international companies likely to possess and leverage large patent
portfolios. Granting exemptions to inventor-owned, closely-held companies or
universities, for instance, would do little to diminish the value of bettering
disclosure requirements. Arguably, such disclosure exemptions would ensure
that financial resources are directed towards domestic innovation in technology
and not wasted in regulatory-compliance costs at the USPTO. Such exemptions
could easily not apply to non-majority shareholders who could exert control over
148
the patent.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Under 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2), the USPTO is responsible for disseminating
149
and under § 2(b)(2) has the authority to
patent information to the public
establish regulations governing the conduct of proceedings at the USPTO in
15 0
Accordingly, to address
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
insufficient patent-ownership disclosure requirements, which in turn do not
provide adequate notice to the U.S. regarding the extent to which international
companies own, license, and could assert U.S. patents, the USPTO should
publish a notice of informal rulemaking pursuant to section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act.'"' There are two approaches this rule could take,
outlined below.
A. MandatoryDisclosuresfor All Applicants
The USPTO could require three disclosures at certain critical junctures
during the application period and after the issuance of the patent. To record the
owner of the patent, these disclosures would require (1) titleholders', (2)
enforcement entities',52 and (3) beneficial owners' information to be submitted
to the USPTO. 5 3 At critical junctures described below, these three disclosures
would be recorded, uploaded, and disseminated publicly via the USPTO's
electronic PAIR system to provide notice in accordance with 35 U.S.C.
§§ 2(a)(2) and 2(b)(2)(C).15 4 Alternatively, the USPTO could decide to keep

18

See supra Part II.C (referring to the beneficial ownership category).

149
150

35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(2) (West 2021).
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(b)(2).

51

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2021).

52

See supra Part II.B (outlining titleholders and enforcement entities).

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2021).
35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(2) (providing that the USPTO "shall be responsible for disseminating to
the public information with respect to patents"); 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(b)(2)(C) (requiring that the
1

154

USPTO "facilitate and expedite the processing of patent applications, particularly those which can
be filed, stored, processed, searched, and retrieved electronically"). Alternatively, the USPTO
could create an electronically searchable registry as proposed in the Pride in Patent Ownership Act,

S. 2774, 117th Cong. (2021).
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such information private and internally track ownership status without providing
public notice of the disclosures, which would still ensure that at least the
government issuing the rights knew who owned them and could address national
security concerns internally.
The titleholder category would disclose the entity that was assigned
ownership of the patent application as the application began prosecution at the
USPTO. The enforcement entities category would disclose all parties who have
standing to sue infringers of the patent. And, the USPTO could incorporate by
reference,"' or draw from, section 16a-2 of the Securities and Exchange Act'16
to require disclosure of beneficial owners.
The beneficial owner category under section 16 would require
disclosures by shareholders who acquire beneficial ownership in a patent at the
USPTO.'? In accordance with the incorporated securities laws, a beneficial
owner would file at the USPTO upon (A) acquiring more than five percent of the
ownership share of the patent,1 58 and (B) at any point where officers, directors,
or ten percent shareholders buy or sell patents or licenses.1 59 Because section 16
only applies to shareholders who can influence or control a company,' 60 the
beneficial ownership category exempts certain people and institutions who own
equity for reasons unrelated to control or influence.161 Given that non-majority
shareholders do not own controlling interests in patents, universities and small
businesses are not-in the absence of the ability to leverage large patent
portfolios-the types of entities that pose national security risks. Because they
expressed concerns regarding the burdens imposed by the Proposed Rule's
regulatory costs, these entities would be exempted from making beneficial
ownership disclosures at the USPTO. Additionally, these entities would also be
exempted from disclosing interested enforcement entities due to the complex and
often burdensome costs of determining who has standing for enforcement
purposes. Exemptions could be granted for such records to remain private as long
as adequate and legitimate privacy concerns were raised. Universities could
honor their confidentiality agreements, small businesses would not have to

15
156

See 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-4 (2021).
§ 240.16a-2 (providing that any directors, officers, and beneficial owners of over ten percent

of equity securities in a company must make financial disclosures with the SEC).

157

§ 240.13d-3 (defining beneficial owner as "any person [or entity] who, directly or indirectly,

through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise" possesses or shares
with others voting power or investment power in the control of securities).
'
§ 240.13d-1 (describing a section 13(d) filing whereupon a beneficial owner of five percent
of securities will file at the SEC).

159
§ 240.16a-1 (describing a section 16(a) filing whereupon directors, officers, and ten percent
shareholders must report a transaction resulting in a change of beneficial ownership in securities).
'6
See Feldman, supra note 89, at 309 (highlighting how shareholders without voting control
over their securities enjoyed a "safe harbor" exemption).
161

17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-(b)(1)(ii) (providing that brokers, banks, insurance companies, and

others are exempted from these filings).
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disclose creditors who use pending applications as collateral, and investors
would not fear the need of disclosing parties who desired to remain unnamed.
Although universities, small businesses, and non-majority shareholders
without a controlling interest might be exempted from disclosing enforcement
entities and beneficial owners (either publicly or in general), all other patent
applicants and patent recipients would be required to provide titleholder,
enforcement entity, and beneficial owner information at three critical junctures:
(1) at the time the patent is initially filed at the USPTO, (2) at the time the patent
is granted, and (3) upon any subsequent transfers in ownership. As described,
entities providing beneficial ownership information (except those exempted)
must file at the USPTO upon acquiring more than five percent of the ownership
share of the patent.1 2 Thus, critical juncture (3) would only come into play when
63
officers, directors, or ten percent shareholders choose to buy or sell (transact)'
with a patent after having filed (1) and (2). Recording these transactions would
include all licensing activity, and therefore the USPTO would have ongoing
notice of any subsequent transfer of patent rights after issuing the patent. It would
also avoid the lengthy and often dispositive fights over patent ownership based
on incomplete recordation that occur relatively frequently under the current

regime.16

Penalties for non-compliance at critical junctures (1) and (2) would
65
A failure to update ownership
result in the abandonment of the patent.'
information during any subsequent transfers in patent rights, critical juncture (3),
would result in the inability to enforce the patent during litigation. These
threatened penalties would provide adequate incentives for patent owners to
provide information for recordation purposes at the USPTO, though they would
be less draconic than having myriad complaints dismissed after the fact, as in the
Uniloc case. Furthermore, any company that attempted to evade beneficial owner
disclosures by contracting around the disclosure requirements would be subject

162

§ 240.13d-1(a) (describing a section 13(d) filing whereupon a beneficial owner of five

percent of securities will file at the SEC).
§ 240.16a-1 (describing a section 16(a) filing whereupon directors, officers, and ten percent
163
shareholders must report a transaction resulting in a change of beneficial ownership in securities).
Perhaps the highest-profile dispute, the Uniloc 2017/Fortress IP default suit, has the
1
potential to rob one patent owner of an entire class of filings based on an incurable standing
deficiency based on poor recordation of transfer documents. See, e.g., Order, Uniloc USA, Inc. v.

Motorola Mobility, No. 17-CV-01658 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2020), ECF No. 114 (dismissing the
Uniloc entities' cases for lack of standing). See also Matthew Bultman, Uniloc's FundingDeal
with Fortress Spurs Litigation Setbacks, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:56 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/unilocs-funding-deal-with-fortress-spurslitigation-setbacks (detailing the likely ongoing loss of standing for actions filed between 2017 and
today).
165
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.135(a) (2021) (describing how failure to update information within a
specified time period leads to abandonment of a patent at the USPTO); Changes to Require

Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105, 4113 (Jan. 24, 2014) (considered for
codification at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1; currently abandoned) (describing abandonment).
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to a fact-specific inquiry.1 66 Any non-exempt entities engaging in "group
action"' 67 would also be subject to the same fact-specific inquiry to determine
whether they had contracted around the beneficial owner disclosure
requirements. The robust history of securities case law and expertise at the SEC
regarding companies who sought to contract around beneficial owner disclosure
requirements would provide ample direction in solving similar problems in the
patent context.
B. Limiting Disclosuresto Companies on the Entity List
Alternatively, the USPTO could take a narrower approach to, at a
minimum, track the extent that international companies control patents. As in the
first approach, the USPTO could require (1) titleholder, (2) enforcement entity,
and (3) beneficial ownership information to be submitted to the USPTO.1 68 These
disclosures would be required (1) at the time the patent is initially filed at the
USPTO, (2) at the time the patent is granted, and (3) upon any subsequent
transfers in patent ownership rights, in accordance with section 16's ownership
disclosures.1 69 At each critical juncture, these disclosures would be recorded,
uploaded, and disseminated via the USPTO's electronic PAIR system to provide

public notice in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(2) and 2(b)(2)(C).17 0
In contrast to the first approach, however, these disclosures could only
apply to the state-sponsored actors recorded on the Department of Commerce's
Entity List and would be subject to political changes and might risk missing
unknown threats or unacknowledged entities.' 7 ' By incorporating by reference 7 2
the DOC's Entity List, disclosure requirements would be limited to Huawei,
ZTE, and other international companies that already pose well-known national
security concerns. This approach would enable the USPTO to forgo
implementing across-the-board disclosures, creating exemptions to those
disclosures, and conducting fact-specific inquiries into companies attempting to

166
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b) (providing that if a party is found to have created an
arrangement designed to avoid disclosing beneficial ownership, the party will be deemed a
beneficial owner nonetheless).
167
See Feldman, supra note 89, at 306, 313 (describing group action as two or more entities
acting together for the purpose of controlling shares).
168
See supra Part II.B (describing ownership disclosures).
169
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (describing a section 13(d) filing whereupon a beneficial owner
of five percent of securities will file at the SEC); see also id. § 240.16a-1 (describing a section
16(a) filing whereupon directors, officers, and ten percent shareholders must report a transaction
resulting in a change of beneficial ownership in securities).
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See 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(2) (West 2021) (providing that the USPTO "shall be responsible for

disseminating to the public information with respect to patents"); 35 U.S.C.A. § 2(b)(2)(C)

(requiring that the USPTO "facilitate and expedite the processing of patent applications,
particularly those which can be filed, stored, processed, searched, and retrieved electronically").
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15 C.F.R. § 744 (Supp. 4 2021).
17 C.F.R. § 270.0-4.
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evade disclosure requirements. It would also eliminate the worrisome regulatory
costs and administrative burdens of requiring across-the-board disclosures. An
additional benefit is that the USPTO is an office within the DOC. Therefore,
administrative costs would be lower than mandatory disclosures for all patent
applicants, and resource allocations could be easily coordinated. Moreover, since
17 3
the DOC routinely updates members on the Entity List, the USPTO would not
risk missing actors who could pose national security risks. Penalties for noncompliance with this approach could similarly result in abandonment or inability
to bring suit in U.S. courts. A major concern with this approach is that it
potentially violates cooperative global patent policy that the USPTO has been
74
trying to foster for many years.1' Furthermore, it could spark fears about
retaliation. However, by only targeting actors that are already known to pose a
risk, these requirements could be justified in the light of national security. These
adverse concerns are likely outweighed by the benefit to U.S. interests in
understanding the full picture of patents the USPTO is granting to international
actors.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although traditional national security concerns have largely ignored
domestic patent policy, U.S. domestic patent policy is directly implicated when
questionable state-sponsored actors, such as Huawei, seek U.S. patent
protection-particularly when they do so at the behest of or in coordination with
the PRC. By turning to U.S. courts and asserting large patent portfolios, Huawei
and others can use massive U.S. patent portfolios to drain resources from
investment in technology via costly litigation or through hefty ongoing royalty
fees likely to end up as a substantial slice of the worldwide 5G market. Given
that the USPTO and the US government currently have no way to identify the
extent to which international companies own, control, and could assert patents,
the U.S. is not aware of the scope of this threat and is certainly at a disadvantage
in identifying future threats from now-unknown national stage actors who might
attempt to abuse our legal processes. Particularly given the recent revelations that
the PRC was, per national policies, flooding the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office with "bad-faith trademark applications" leading to a large number of
75
"suspect trademarkapplications,"1 it stands to reason that the patent application
system is equally susceptible to such manipulation and abuse by national
interests. The current potential legislation addressing these concerns-surely
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15 C.F.R. § 744.
See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 15.

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. supra note 5. (finding that "[a] growing number of suspect
trademark applications filed in the United States from China prompted the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) to study the reasons for this development," concluding that "China's
filings are influenced by non-market factors such as subsidies, government mandates, bad-faith
trademark applications, and defensive countermeasures").
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either passed or tabled by the time this article is read-are helpful starts that may
improve patent ownership clarity and allow the U.S. government to better police
the powerful rights it so regularly issues. But we need not rely on or wait for
legislation to do so. By enacting a rule requiring specific mandatory ownership
disclosures, the USPTO could itself identify companies who control U.S. patents
and are most likely to assert them against U.S. companies. This information
could elucidate the scope of the problem and serve as a data point to inform future
government action. Congress could also act to empower the agency to do so
explicitly, as has been suggested. Either way, the U.S. government should study
the problem and find a way to understand-or even know-if other nations are
abusing our U.S. patent system. Justice may be blind, but we need not be.

